t has been said that insurance is the last of the financial services to accept radical change (Denney [1995 (Denney [ -1996 ) . Yet there has been a fundamental shift in the geographic location and in the organization of the reinsurance industry in the last six years (Chichilnisky [19966] ) . Global environmental risks are partly responsible for this change ; increased weather volatility and catastrophic risks are difficult to diversify using traditional insurance practices.
To provide a map to the future, we need a realistic appraisal of how we got where we are. This is the story of how humans have hedged risks. There are two basic and distinct approaches : statistical and economic. The former is typical of the insurance industry ; the latter typifies the securities industry. Both are needed to manage today's catastrophic risks. Neither alone will do. We show how a combination of both leads to efficient outcomes, and is the way to the future (Chichilnisky [1996a (Chichilnisky [ , 1996b (Chichilnisky [ , 1996d ) .
The volatility of weather, taken together with population movement to warm coastal areas and changing property prices, has made catastrophic risks highly unpredictable. Many scientists believe that climate change could be the source . A recent report by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), charged by governments with investigating global warming, says that humans have a "discernible" influence on global climate.
In May 1996, insurance executives confronted the energy industry over global warming, and took their case to the United Nations Geneva meeting on climate change in June 1996 (Boulton [1996] ) . Their case was heard, and for the first time the United States took a leading position in supporting the developing countries' calls for hard targets in the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in the industrial countries. Environmental markets that trade countries' rights to emit have been proposed and loom large on the horizon. 1
FINANCIAL RISKS
Although the data on climate change are not conclusive, the financial challenge is already real . In the last few years the property/casualty insurance industry has experienced record claims of about USS43 billion connected with climate volatility. In the United States alone, there was the 1988 Midwest drought, the 1993 Midwest floods, and 1995 flooding along the California coast. Hurricane Andrew in 1992 produced about US318 billion of insured losses and total losses greater than USS25 billion (Chichilnisky [1996a] ) .
Andrew was the most devastating natural catastrophe ever recorded . It also led to a wave of financial catastrophe; the hurricane affected almost every insur ance company in the United States . Not knowing how to hedge unpredictable risks adds the risk of financial catastrophe on top of that of the natural catastrophe, a one-two punch that could lead to a societal disaster. The year after Andrew, thirty-eight non-U.S. and eight U.S. reinsurers, with names as familiar as Continental Re and New England Re, either withdrew from the business or ceased underwriting catastrophe reinsurance (Chichilnisky [1996b] ) .
Facing an impossible challenge, many reinsurers left the market . Worldwide reinsurance capacity dropped more than 30% between 1939 and 1993, and it appears that over 20% of that is due to Andrew. This naturally led to changes in the marketplace. Insurance companies could not buy enough catastrophe reinsurance, no matter how hard they tried. As supply dried up, prices of course increased dramatically ; the rate on line went from 8 .2% in 1989 to 21 .4% in 1994 .
Higher prices then attracted new capital. This led to a major geographic shift of the industry. Continuing doubts about the future existence of Lloyd's of London led to a drop in the U.K . market share, from about 56% in 1989 to 23%1 in 1995 . Since 1993 Bermuda's reinsurance industry evolved from practically zero to its current position of 25% of the MANAGING UNKNOWN RLSKS market . Investment banks are now betting heavily on the reinsurance market . They are the owners of most of the businesses created since 1992.
REVOLUTION IN GLOBAL FINANCE
Together with the geographic shift, there has been a substantial shift in the industry's strategy. The insurance derivatives that have been recommended for several years are starting to play a role.
In 1992, we recommended the creation of an instrument to bet on the frequencies of catastrophes, which the Chicago Board of Trade (CBOT) introduced under the name Catastrophe Futures in 1993 (see Chichilnisky and Heal [1993] ). In 1997, Morgan
Stanley started marketing a similar instrument : a bond issue whose returns are linked to hurricane frequency arid severity in the current US. season . Recently, Merrill Lynch structured a transaction for USAA, the country's largest direct marketer ofhome and car insurance, offering USS500 million in bonds on the U.S. capital markets that are tied to the company's losses from hurricanes (see Waters [1996] ) .
Financial innovation in reinsurance markets is slowly developing, but the underlying pressure' is relentless. Everyone knows that access to more liquid capital markets is essential to the reinsurance industry. The derivatives market is the key to liquid arid flexible trading of weather risks.
UNKNOWN RISKS
Unknown risks are risks whose frequencies we do riot know, and for which we are aware of ourigno-rance (Chichilnisky [19964] ) . You could think of these as risks for which we have more than one actuarial table, each equally likely. There is more than one prior estimate of' the frequency of the event (see Cass, Chichilnisky, and Wtr [1996] ) .
Examples of unknown risks are environmental health risks of new and little known epidemics, or risks induced by scientific uncertainty in predicting the fre quency and severity of catastrophic events such as nuclear reactor and satellite risks. These risks are driving major changes in the insurance and reinsurance industry today (see Chichilnisky and Heal [1998] How could this be? Easily. There nnay be two possible climate patterns, both equally likely. This is typical of complex arid chaotic systems such as the climate (see Chichilmsky [1995] ) .
Many climate experts view climate as a fiuidamentally non-linear phenomenon in which chaotic patterns emerge easily. Such systems can have two "attrac tors," or two distinct overall patterns of behavior, each significantly likely. Each of these attractors describes a weather pattern, a reasonable statistical inference of the frequencies of a major event. In such a chaotic systern, it is scientifically impossible to predict from the initial conditions which of the two patterns the climate will take: a pattern with two hurricanes a year, or the other with a dozen. Because we cannot predict, we face a risk. We call it a chaotic risk because it emerges from the chaotic nature of the climate system .
The first statistical reaction is to construct a new actuarial table by taking an average ; assurning the two states, 2% and 12%, are equally likely, this is 7%. But taking an average does not help. It only ensures that one is wrong 100% of the time: 50% of the time we are overinsured (the pattern with two hurricanes per year), and the other 50% we are underinsured (the pattern with a dozen a year) . Both have major financial costs. If each hurricane leads to US$2 billion in losses, the averaging method leads to a US$10 billion shortfall 50% of the time and US$10 billion overinsurance the other 50% of the time. Hardly a measured way to manage risks .
Is there a solution to this problem? The good news is that there is. It is possible to hedge such unknown risks successfully and efficiently. To do so, however, one needs a careful and customized approach that blends both insurance and securities approaches to hedging risks . SLIMMER 1998 Insurance: The Statistical Approach
TWO WAYS TO HEDGE RISK
The statistical approach to hedging risks, which relies on the law of large numbers, is the traditional foundation of the insurance industry.
For this to work, risks must be reasonably independent across individuals or groups, and the frequencies must be known. Loss of life arid car accidents are typical ex:unples. Here the law of large numbers operates .
There is safety in numbers ; with a large enough population, the number of those likely to be affected is known with considerable accuracy. The sarriple mean is highly predictable if the distribution for each person or group is known. This is the standard principle oil which insurance operates .
Reinsurance is simply a way to augment the pool of those affected so that the law of large numbers operates better. All that is needed is a reliable actuarial table describing the incidence per person or group, and a large pool of insureds to distribute the risk (see Chichilriisky arid Heal [1993] ) .
If the numbers are not large enough, it is standard to spread risk through time. The number of people affected by a hurricane over a tern-year period is at least ten times that affected in one year. This requires that the risks be independent through time, eliminating irreversible risks such as once-and-for-all shifts arising from global warming .
Hurricanes such as Andrew (1992) and Opal (1995), however, defy the law of large numbers. They affect large areas all at once, both in physical arid in firian" cial terms, arid their frequency and severity seem to'be changing. The actuarial table itself has become the risk. Insurance does not work. What are the alternatives?
Derivatives : The Economic Approach Ail alternative is the economic approach . This works best for correlated risks, in which the same event occurs for many people all at once. A drop ill the value of the dollar is an example ; the event is the same for everyone in the US. economy. There is no way to pool this risk, although, as we all know, we can hedge it by using derivatives (currency futures or options) . The principle used here is negative correlation . One hedges by taking a position that is highly correlated with the risk, except with the opposite sign.
For example, an investor with a dollar-based portfolio who fears a drop in the value of the dollar can buy a futures contract ill yen, or a dollar put . If the dol lar drops in value, the investor is covered by the increase in the value of the derivative. Bear funds have been constructed on this principle .
The economic procedure is radically different from the insurance approach in that it does not require a large number of people. Nor does it require knowing the frequency ofthe event or the actuarial table. This frrrida-mentally different method is the way the securities industry operates . Instead of pooling risks, one trades risks.
Securities markets are, however, notoriously complex. For example, the procedure of trading risks just outlined makes no sense for individual risks, such as death. How would we describe the death of one single person within a large economy as one event on which all of us can trade? To do so would require an unrealistically high number of securities, indeed 2', where x is the number of people in the economy. In a world with five billion people, the number of securities could exceed the number of all known particles in the universe (see Chichilrlisky and Heal [1993] ) .
Insurance, instead, deals with such risks expeditiously. If all individuals are in a similar risk class, one insurance contract would suffice. The contrast is stark, but it makes a point. In a world of unknown risks, neither securities nor insurance rilethods work in isolation .
THE IDEAL HEDGE: CATASTROPHE BUNDLES
We see that insurance does not work when the frequency of a risk is unknown, arid securities do not work when the risks are individual . If neither of these two approaches works on its own, what does work?
The ideal hedge is a combination of insurance and securities; this earl achieve efficient allocation of risk-bearing . We call this a catastrophe bundle because it bundles together two types ofinstruments. It consists of ail insurance instrument with a novel derivative security for betting on the frequency itself (see Chichilrlisky and Heal [1993] ).
The latter type of security has emerged and is now traded oil the CBOT As we have mentioned, related securities have recently emerged also in the form ofbonds floated by Morgan Stanley arid Merrill Lynch.
The combination of both instruments ensures that no financial catastrophe will occur, since the reinsurer is not exposed to more risks than it can afford . At the same time, this approach can be used to provide nearly full coverage for the insured at a rninirrlal cost.
We show elsewhere that such instruments lead to an efficient allocation of risk-bearing (see Heal [1993, 1995] and Cass, Chichllillsky and Wu [1996] ). They require a carefully customized approach to hedging risk. This gives the traditional face-to-face insurance approach an edge over raw technology.
MANAGING UNKNOWN RISK HOW DO CATASTROPHE BUNDLES WORK?
Catastrophe bundles work best in the hands of an experienced reirlsurer or broker who can customize the instrument to the client's needs. Ill a wily, the reirl surer is selling a package that consists of insurance, a security, and a risk managernerit/consulting tool.
The broker must first identify with the client the set of possible descriptions of the risk. This crucial part of the process involves new techniques of risk manage rilerlt. It is best handled on a face-to-face and customized basis. A mathematical formula is then brought to bear in customizing catastrophe bundles to customer needs. This formula works very well when there is more than one pattern of risk and therefore more than one "possible" actuarial table, each table being substantially likely.
After this is achieved, derivative securities whose payoffs depend on which description of the risk is correct are introduced . These securities serve to hedge uncertainty about actuarial tables . Finally, one structures insurance contracts that establish a compensation arrangement in a way that depends on which description of the risk is correct.
Catastrophe bundles are proprietary, and their use in a particularly simple case is illustrated in Exhibit 1 .
PRICING AND OPTIMAL PORTFOLIOS
Fund rnarlagers earl look at the flip side of this picture and seek a combination of insurance and securities that offer an optimal portfolio in insurance and investment markets. A part of this instrument is what Merrill Lynch and Morgan Stanley have floated recently. Securitizing such instruments is, of course, the next step.
Through the use of catastrophe bundles, the reinsurance broker can access a large pool of managed fiends while offering its clients a customized reinsurance service that manages risks optimally, and at very competitive prices .
Pricing, of course, is a crucial issue. What is needed here is to separate two parts of the risks and to push each as far as it will go . The contingent insurance part of the instrument should be applied as far as possible, covering the independent part of the risk for which it is optimally suited . Securities are then used for the purpose for which they are best : the correlated part of the risk . A mathematical formula used to construct the catastrophe bundle separates and prices both parts. Insurance covers individual property risks Securities cover frequency risk
CONVERGENCE OF INSURANCE AND SECURITIES MARKETS
It is no secret that the securities industry is making inroads into the reinsurance business . By itself, however, it cannot succeed, because the individual parts of the risks cannot be handled efficiently by securities markets ; they are too cumbersome for individual risks. Insurance, based on the law of large numbers, has an important place in simplifying financial transactions and hedging known individual risks.
Catastrophe bundles offer one approach to cornputing the limits of each instrument, and blending them optimally to achieve the most competitive pricing of a catastrophe reinsurance portfolio .
The future of the industry is in the hands of those who achieve the optimum balance, through integrating derivative securities with contingent insurance contracts, and integrating technology with customized face-to-face know-how.
How exactly would catastrophe bundles work? We answer that question with a simple but typical example, drawn from hurricane insurance. Hurricane incidence is conditioned by the ENSO cycle, so we consider, instead of hurricane bonds of the type that have recently been issued, a tradable ENSO index.2 This index would achieve everything one needs from hurricane bonds, but in a more general and simple fashion .
A tradable ENSO index is a contract that pays an agreed amount contingent on the value of a physical index. It is similar in concept to the catastrophe futures traded on the CBOT, and is an example of a security conditional on the incidence of the insured peril, that is, on which risk description is correct.
There are two extreme states o£ the ENSO cycle, known as El Nifio and La Nina. In El N14 110 years, hurricane incidence in the southeastern US. is below average ; in La Nina years, it is above.
Exhibit 1 shows possible probability distributions of damage due to hurricanes conditional on El Nifo or La Nina years.
As an example, assume that, in an El Nino year, there is a 10% chance of a $5 billion loss, a 20% chance of a $10 billion loss, and a 10% chance of a $15 billion loss. The expected value of the damage is therefore (0.1 x $5) + (0.2 x $10)+(0.1 x $15) = $4 billion. In a La Nifia year, the probabilities are 20%, 30%, and 20%, respectively, giving an expected loss of $7 billion . Assume that there is a 40% chance of an El Nino year, and a 60% chance of a La Nifia year. The total value of insured property is taken as $30 billion, so that in a worst case scenario -when the hurricane damage is at its maximum of$15 billion -halfofthus value is at risk.
In an El Nifo year, the expected loss is 13.33% of the insured risks, and in a La Nina year, it is 23.33%. It follows that the rates on line (i.e., premiums as a per centage of the insured amount) conditional on being in El Nifio and La Nina years would need to be at least 13 .33% and 23.33%, respectively, to break even in expected value terms. Before we know what kind of year will occur, we therefore have an expected loss due to El Niflo equal to the expected loss in an El Niflo year times the probability of such a year, i.e., (0.4 x $4) = $1 .6 billion. For La Nifia, the equivalent calculation is (0.6 x $7) = $4.2 billion . Hence, ex ante, before we know which year we are or will be in, the expected losses in El Niflo arid La Nina years are, respectively, $1 .6 billion and $4.2 billion, giving a total of $5.8 billion as the annual expected loss altogether.
We can now compute the prelniurne that would have to be charged for cover in each type of year before the type of year is known, in order to break even on average . These would have to be the premiums contingent on being in each year -seen above to be 13.33% and 23.33% for El Nifio arid La Nifiamultiplied by the probabilities of each type of year. Thus the ex ante rates on line (before it is known whether we are in an El Niflo or a La Nifia year) have to be at least (0.4 x 13.33%) = 5.33% or (0.6 x 23 .33%) = 13.99%, respectively.
If insurers follow 'the obvious and traditional procedure of charging premiuriL based on the overall expected loss and not distinguishing between the two climate patterns, they will charge premiums that will bring in their overall ex ante expected loss of $5.8 billion, implying a rate on line of 5.8/3() = 19.33%. This is unsatisfactory because in El Niflo years they are overcharging (expected claims are $4 billion; the rate on line need be only 13.33%); La Nifia years, they are undercharging (expected claims are $7 billion; a rate oil line of 23.33% is needed) .
In the former case, the insurers are charging premiums in excess of expected losses by $1 .8 billion, hardly a competitive strategy, and in the latter case, prenriuni income falls short of expected claims by $1 .2 billion, clearly a dangerous and unsustainable position . Neither case is satisfactory. To match assets to liabilities properly, insurers need to shift income from El Niflo to La Nifia years . This is where securities conditional on incidence, on description of the risk, come into the picture. They can be used to transfer income between El Niflo and La Nifia years so that the surplus in the former cover the deficit in the latter . We need a security whose value depends on the incidence ofhurricanes; for the purposes ofthis example, we take this to be a tradable ENSO index. This would be a contract whose value depends on the value of the ENSO index and in which traders can take long or A short positions. By trading this security, the insurer in our example can in effect trade income in El Niflo years for income in La Nifia years .
The odds work out nicely. The insurer wants to sell $1 .8 billion in an El Nifro year, its surplus of premium income over expected claims, which occurs with a 40% chance . Correspondingly, it needs to buy $1 .2 billion of income in La Nifia years, to cover the shortfall between premium income and expected claims. Ill our example, this happens 60% of the time.
The prices for ENSO index contracts delivering $1 in El Nifio and La Nifia years will be proportional to the probabilities ofthese events, and so will be in the ratio of 0.4/0.6 or 2/3. But $1 .2 billion/$1 .8 billion = 2/3, so that at such prices the sale of surplus income in El Niflo years will exactly finance the purchase of income to cover the deficit in La Nifia years .
Overall, then, we have a pattern of transactions as follows :
1 . Issuing insurance contracts which provide cover against damage in either El Niflo or La Nina years. 2. Selling $1.8 billion of contracts contingent on the ENSO index having a value corresponding to an El Niflo year, at a price of $0.40 per dollar. 3. Buying $1 .2 billion of contracts contingent on the This specific combination of trades in securities and insurance policies described in these steps is what we refer to as "catastrophe bundles." Through trading catastrophe bundles, insurers can arrange complete cover for themselves and their clients at minimum cost, in spite of not knowing what the odds of loss will be. They achieve this by a specific tailor-made combination of insurance contracts and securities . All these contracts are conditional on the incidence of the insured risk.
How different is this approach from the practice today? The securities issued today securitiee insurance or reinsurance risks, and therefore bring more liquidity to the reinsurance market . This is an improvement. But these securities still leave open the possibility that the insurer is either offering non-competitive rates or taking on a dangerous exposure . Today's securities do not tackle the essence of the problem.
The key to catastrophe bundles is to recognize that when there are several possible actuarial tables, all reasonably likely, we have to supplement insurance introducing and trading securities dependent on them. A specific combination of insurance and securities, and an equally specific pricing policy, are required for an optimal allocation of risks on competitive terms.
-ENDNOTES 'Chichilnisky [199(w] advances a proposal for a global rnarket on greenlaousc g .Le emissions :and an International Bank for Envirorunental Settlements to Inaradle executions, clearing, aril settlements as well as regulate borrowing and lending rates.
ZENSO stands for the El Niio-Soudaern Oscillator, the narne given to t}ne weather pattern that originates is the equatorial Pacific and influences rainfall and storm incidence from Australia to southern Africa . An indicator of die state of tire ENSO cycle is a sea surface temperature (SST) index for the equatorial Pacific.
SUMMER I"a 3Tlnas Ls a sinaplaication . There are also years that are neither, so-called neutral years. The numbers we use in this example are purely illustrative .
